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Sources of Investment Inefficiency:  
The Case of Fixed-Asset Investment in China 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to measure the inefficiency associated with aggregate investment in 
a transitional economy. The inefficiency is decomposed into allocative and production 
inefficiency based on standard production theory. Allocative inefficiency is measured by 
disequilibrium investment demand. Institutional factors are then taken into consideration as 
possible explanatory variables of the disequilibrium. The resulting model is applied to 
Chinese provincial panel data. The main findings are: Chinese investment demand is 
strongly receptive to expansionary fiscal policies and inter-provincial network effects; and 
although there are signs of increasing allocative efficiency, the tendency of over-
investment remains, even with improvements in production efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Over-investment occurs when output growth lags behind investment growth due to lack 
of appropriate growth in capital productivity. Over-investment used to plague centrally 
planned economies (CPEs), see, Kornai (1980) and Begg et al, (1990), who refer to the 
phenomenon as ‘investment hunger’. Clearly, large-scale over-investment is likely to occur 
when a well-functioning capital market in an economy is lacking, and that would incur 
sizeable efficiency loss. An interesting and challenging question is whether such loss could 
be measured and explained by certain economic factors. The present study attempts to 
tackle the question with a model designed for a panel data set on provincial investment in 
China. 
Investment-driven growth remains a crucial development strategy in China although it 
abandoned the CPE system over two decades ago (e.g., Nasution, 1999). Figure 1 presents 
a few key aspects concerning China’s fixed-asset investment since 1980. 1
Persistent investment growth in excess of output can imply decreasing capital 
productivity, and volatile investment growth can result in high efficiency loss as 
investment normally bears high adjustment costs. Recent concerns over the banking sector 
reforms and economic overheating in China actually relate closely to the problems of over-
 The figure 
indicates that the growth of fixed-asset investment has been faster and more volatile than 
GDP growth; capital formation has risen significantly in terms of its GDP composition, 
from below 30% in the 1980s to above 40% since 2003; and total bank savings exceeded 
total bank loans in the mid 1990s for the first time since 1950, stimulating greatly the 
central government deficit financing activities. In fact, the sharp rise of deficits was not 
restricted to the central government. It also occurred widely at the provincial level (see 
Figure 2). 
                                               
1 For a more detailed description of the recent investment-output situation in China, see, Qin et al (2006). 
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investment and under-utilised capital in production, e.g. see, Goldstein and Lardy (2004). 
But the questions why the extensive reforms have not yet cured the investment hunger and 
how much and in what way the Chinese economy has suffered from the efficiency loss of 
over-investment remain unresolved to most researchers and practitioners.  
Studies on China’s aggregate investment lack conclusive views on the above questions. 
For example, Wang and Fan (2000) maintain that the investment hunger is not yet over on 
the basis of the observations that policy-induced impulsive investment behaviour is still 
prevalent; soft loans are still available from the banking system; and investment structure 
is severely unbalanced especially in view of the relatively poor performance and relatively 
rich capital formation in a sizeable part of the state-owned sector. However, they recognise 
some signs of improvement in investment efficiency since the reforms, such as rising 
transformation rates from investment to capital formation, and increasing shares of 
investments by the non-state-owned sector and the foreign sector. Zhang (2002) is very 
critical of the positive contribution of capital investment to China’s long-term growth. He 
regards the overgrowth of investment versus GDP as a sign of excessive investment and 
deterioration in investment efficiency. By showing decelerating growth in total factor 
productivity and diminishing investment returns during the 1990s, Zhang suggests that 
China’s overall fixed-asset investment has gone too far, especially with regard to its labour 
resource. He ascribes the problems mainly to institutional distortion, which induces a 
mixture of the traditional tendency of over-investment with excessive regional competition 
for capital as a result of fiscal decentralisation. The latter factor has attracted increasing 
attention in recent years. For instance, Zhang and Zou (1996) demonstrate empirically that 
a higher degree of fiscal decentralisation is associated with lower provincial growth. They 
thus infer that fiscal decentralisation must have caused severe capital shortage for 
infrastructure investment at the national level, which is vital for rapid economic growth. 
The problem is more extensively examined by Young (2000), who shows that 
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decentralisation has resulted in significant fragmentation of internal markets that lead to 
inefficiency in resource allocation. But these empirical findings are somewhat at odds with 
Huang’s detailed analysis of the political economy of central-local relations in investment 
controls (1996). Huang argues that China’s present de facto federal system should have the 
merits of reducing co-ordination costs and improving economic governance. The economic 
role of federalism is further theorised by Qian and Roland (1998), who postulate two main 
effects. The first is the competitive effect of federalism, which could lead to regional 
investment distortion; the second is the checks-and-balances effect of federalism, which 
should result in hardening soft budgets for state-owned firms.  
Unfortunately, there is a sizeable gap between the theoretical and empirical discussions 
on the possible inefficiency in China’s aggregate investment. While most theories are 
concerned with possible misallocation of financial resources due to imperfect capital 
markets, empirical evidence is focused on production efficiency, such as productivity 
changes of capital in aggregate production functions or changing shares of capital to labour 
inputs.2
The present study is an attempt to fill the gap. We adopt the standard theory of capital 
input demand with the associated measures of investment efficiency under perfect market 
conditions and extend them to cover a transitional economy. This allows us to disentangle 
 The problem, we believe, lies mainly in the different economic environments in 
which the issue has been considered. In a market economy, investment decisions are 
mostly made at the firm level and therefore the issue of investment efficiency falls 
formally in the realm of microeconomics; whereas in a transitional economy, the market is 
far from perfect and micro investment decisions are still significantly affected by various 
institutional factors. 
                                               
2  Bai et al (1997) point out that improvements in production efficiency in terms of total factor 
productivity may not lead to more efficient resource allocation in a mixed market where firms are not solely 
profit maximisers. 
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investment efficiency into two types: efficiency in investment allocation and efficiency in 
capital utilisation during production. We are particularly interested in identifying and 
estimating how institutional factors have contributed to over-investment via investment 
misallocation. Our empirical model uses a panel data set of 30 provinces in China over the 
period 1989-2004.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a general theoretical 
framework for defining and measuring investment inefficiency; section 3 extends the 
framework to transitional economies; empirical results are presented in section 4; and the 
final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Investment Inefficiency: A Conceptual Framework 
In order to define measures of inefficiency in aggregate investment, we follow 
convention by using the neoclassical model as the theoretical base, see, Caballero (1999). 
The model defines the desired investment as the capital input demand which meets the 
cost-minimising or profit-maximisation condition. This enables us to define over-
investment (or under-investment) as deviations of actual investment from the desired level. 
The theory also provides us with two measures of efficiency   production efficiency 
(PE),4
Let us assume a homothetic production function involving only two inputs – capital and 
labour. Under the equilibrium state, this production function is expected to maintain 
 which is associated with both the technological and managerial aspects of how 
capital assets are utilised in production, and allocative efficiency (AE), which evaluates 
how production decisions are made in accordance with market demand and supply 
conditions (see, e.g. Färe and Primont, 1995; Greene, 1997). 
                                               
3  Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are counted as provinces, but Chongqing, the new autonomous 
municipality, is still regarded as part of Sichuan. 
4 We avoid the more commonly used term ‘technological efficiency’ because of its lack of emphasis on 
the managerial side, which should be more important for Chinese firms during the reforms. 
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constant returns to scale. Following the common practice in aggregate production function 
research, e.g. see (Berndt, 1991, Chapter 6), we adopt a constant-returns-to-scale CES 
(constant elasticity of substitution) function for the production function:  
(1)  ρρρ αα
1
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ρ  
where ρ is the substitution parameter mapping into σ, the elasticity of substitution. Under 
the condition of cost minimisation or profit maximisation: 
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the desired factor input demand entails the equality between the marginal rate of technical 
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Hence, the factor input demand function for K* can be derived by combining the first-order 
condition of (1) with (3) (see, e.g. Varian 2006, Chapter 20): 
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Now, investment amounts to: 
(5)  1)1( −−−= ttt KKI δ  
where δ is the effective depreciation rate for K. When capital stock is at its equilibrium, K*, 
we should have: 
 (6)  ** KI δ=  
 Combining (6) and (4) and taking natural logarithms, we obtain: 
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where C* denotes the standard user cost of capital: 
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In (8), r is the real interest rate for investment loans and π  is the tax rate.  
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We are now in the position of defining the two measures of efficiency. According to 
the established procedures, PE corresponds to the fixed individual effect decomposed from 
the intercept term of a regression model under a cross-section or panel setting, e.g. see, 
Greene (1997). Specifically, a measure of PE, denoted by Λi, can be defined via extending 
A of (7) to a panel-data situation where i denotes the individual entry in a panel of size N: 
(9)  { } NiAA iiiiiiii ,,1explnlnln =−=Λ⇒Λ−+= σαδασδ  
As for AE, it is commonly defined by the ratio of the actual price ratio to the 
equilibrium price ratio given in (3):5
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In the present context, we are only interested in Ζk and/or ΖI. Since *jP  is unobservable in 
practice, Ζs are often viewed as a set of parametric correction in input factor prices. The set 
can be estimated either directly from the secondary price space of firms’ cost-minimising 
function constrained by a production function, or indirectly from the primal goods space of 
firms’ input demand function conditional on cost minimisation by means of an input 
distance function (see Atkinson and Cornwell, 1994, Atkinson and Primont, 2002).6
(11)  
 If the 
latter route is chosen, the AE measure of ΖI  becomes: 
ζ=−=Ζ⇒=Ζ ** lnlnln III
I
II  
Interestingly, Caballero et al (1995) refer to ζ as the ‘mandated’ investment rate and 
employ the cointegration approach to measure it using time-series data. The approach 
essentially regards ζ as a disequilibrium investment rate, where 0>tζ  reflects over-
                                               
5 The actual market price ratio is more frequently used in equation (3) in the empirical literature. Under 
that context, firm specific shadow prices are employed in contrast with market prices, e.g. see Baños-Pino et 
al (2001). 
6 A detailed explanation of the duality of the two approaches can be found in Färe and Primont (1995). 
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investment and 0<tζ  under investment. This disequilibrium rate now becomes an AE 
measure under the assumption that perfect market equilibrium is the most efficient state. 
Combining (11) with (7) and writing the model in a panel model setting, we have: 
(12)   [ ] NiCYAI itititit ,,1lnlnln =−−−= σζ  
Clearly, full efficiency implies 0=itζ .  
It is still premature to apply (12) directly to China’s investment data. As mentioned in 
the previous section, most of the concerns over China’s over-investment relate to financial 
resource misallocation due to an imperfect market environment. But model (12) does not 
address these concerns. When the market condition is imperfect, the investment demand of 
firms is expected to adapt to the imperfect market environment. Hence, ζit might not be a 
correct measure under such circumstances. In the next section, we shall try to extend (12) 
and develop suitable AE measures for a transitional economy. 
3. Allocative Inefficiency under Institutional Constraints 
The trait of an imperfect market is cost/price distortion. In the extreme case of a CPE, 
budget constraints of state-owned firms are known to be soft (Kornai, 1980) and their 
production objectives not aiming at profit maximisation. These characteristics have 
remained in spite of China’s continued economic reforms, see e.g. Liu, (2001); Dong and 
Putterman (2002). For instance, ideological concern for spatial equality and defence 
consideration used to be among the key objectives in state investment plans, (see Ma and 
Wei, 1997). 
Since a mixed objective-maximising function should correspond to a cost-minimising 
function with soft budget constraints, a natural way to modify the investment demand 
function is to extend the standard cost function in (2) such that it takes into consideration 
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those market disequilibrating institutional effects.7
)(xZ τ
 We adopt this approach and attach to 
the capital component a multiplicative function  representing the institutional effects 
on fixed capital investment: 
(13)  [ ]LPKZP lk +)(xτ  
where x denotes a set of disequilibrating soft budget indicators such that 1)0( =τZ . For 
operational purposes, we specify )(xZ τ  as an exponential function: 
(14)  { }∑= j jj xZ ττ exp)(x  
Substituting (14) into (13) and minimising the resultant equation subject to (1), we arrive at 
the following counterpart of (12) under a mixed market condition: 
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While ζit of (12) gives us a measure of AE under perfect market conditions, τζ it  of (15) 
adapts the measure to a mixed market situation. Their difference, τζζ itit − , is just )(xZ
τ  in 
logarithm. This demonstrates that )(xZ τ  is in effect an AE measure of how much the 
institutional factors would cause investment misallocation. This measure has the advantage 
of explicitly evaluating the positive and negative contribution of each of the institutional 
factors to AE. It indicates a way in which theories concerning efficiency-related 
institutional factors during reforms could be tested.8
                                               
7 Another approach is disaggregation, i.e. to formulate a two-sector model with different behavioural 
rules for the state-owned sector and the non-state-owned sector. However, this approach may not fully reflect 
the fact that it is becoming harder to differentiate firms’ behaviour simply by ownership in China, since many 
firms suffer from incompletely specified property rights, or have their ownership diversified due to the 
gradual privatisation programme. Besides, disaggregation involves a substantial increase in data 
requirements. 
 
8  Theorisation of efficiency and institutional changes is still in the making, see e.g. Yao (2002), and 
desires better interactions with applied studies. 
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Let us now consider how to select and specify x. Two general principles guide the 
selection. These variables must embody institutional disequilibrating effects, and they must 
satisfy 1)0( =τZ . The latter implies that the x should be ratio variables in logarithms. 
Taking into consideration those factors that have been suggested repeatedly in the relevant 
literature, such as regional factors arising from decentralisation, as well as data availability, 
we construct the following indicators: 
a) 1x : the nation-wide effect of deficit-financing fiscal policies, which is taken as the 
logarithm of the ratio of the total government debt incurred to the debt payment;  
b) ix2 : the local government expansionary fiscal policy effect, which is taken as the 
logarithm of the ratio of provincial government expenditure to revenue;9
c) 
  
ix3 : one period lagged deviation of provincial over-investment rate, ζit-1, from its 
regional average, which is intended to capture the herding effect of over-investment 
due to provincial competition or spill-over effect, in addition to what x2i captures; 
d)  ix4 : regional growth effect, which is defined as the logarithm of the one-period 
lagged ratio of provincial per capita GDP to its regional average; 
e)  5x : the logarithm of the bank loan-deposit ratio at the national level. 
Detailed definition of these variables and the division of three regions10
4. Empirical Results 
 are given in the 
Appendix. 
                                               
9 The post-1994 data on x2i do not represent as drastic an increase in provincial government deficit as 
Figure 2 suggests. This is because a new system of tax division was introduced in 1994, which entails part of 
the tax collected nationally to be returned to provinces by certain formulae, whereas the published local 
government revenue account does not contain this part. Nevertheless, local government deficit financing is 
mainly responsible for the nation-wide government debt, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
10 Here, we adopt the division of three broad regions by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, also 
see Song et al (2001). 
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A major issue in bridging static theories such as (12) and (15) with time-series data is 
how the dynamic information in data should be handled and interpreted. The key is to 
choose appropriate model specification and estimation methods. For model specification, 
we follow Caballero et al (1995) and regard ζ as the disequilibrium investment rate. In 
other words, we regard (12) and (15) as depicting the disequilibrium errors of the 
designated long-run equilibrium state which is hypothetically embedded in the dynamic 
data generation process. When the process is characterised by a dynamic model, the 
equilibrium state is expected to correspond to the long-run solution of the model, which is 
now commonly obtained by the cointegration technique, as the economic time series 
involved are normally nonstationary i.e., unit-roots feature in most of the macro economic 
time series. 
The unit-root feature is widely observed among most of the time series in the available 
empirical studies on China’s aggregation investment, e.g. see, Sun (1998); Song et al 
(2001); He and Qin (2004) and Qin et al (2006). In view of this and also the very limited 
power of unit-root tests for panel data, we bypass the test here and adopt the panel DOLS 
(Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares) method to estimate the long-run parameters in (12) and 
(15), see, Kao et al (1999) and Kao and Chiang (2000).11
(16)  
 Taking (12) for example, the 
DOLS refers to the OLS estimate of σ  in the following dynamic specification of (12): 
( ) nieCCAAYI it
k
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−θσ  
where A0t represents random time effect and θik are short-run parameters. The assumption 
of constant return to scale is maintained in (16) without empirical testing. This is because  
this assumption has been verified in the above cited studies on China’s aggregate 
investment as well as in Qin and Song (2003). 
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Table 1 reports the DOLS estimates of σ over various sample periods, using an annual 
panel data set of 30 provinces covering 1989-2004 (see the appendix for the details of data 
sources and definitions).12 It is noticeable from the table that the estimates of σ are small 
and insignificant for sub-samples prior to 2001. This finding corroborates those reported in 
Sun (1980), Song et al (2001) and He and Qin (2003). It indicates that the actual Cit has not 
been widely perceived as an effective cost-minimising signal until very recent years. This 
is also consistent with Stigilitz’s observation (1996, p97) that firms in a transition economy 
tend to undertake grandiose investment projects, because their decisions generally do not 
bear the risks or costs of mistakes that they might make, but may, however, get credit for 
any achievement under their direction. On the other hand, the reforms have been gradual 
and the cost signals have not been allowed fully effective since the 1980s. For example, the 
bank lending rates and investment prices were still under heavy administration during a 
large part of the early sample period.  
To further identify the insensitivity of the cost signal, we re-estimate the model with C 
being decomposed into three parts: 
(17)  ( ) ( )it
itY
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PrC πσσδσσ −+



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where σ0 >0, σ1 >0, and σ2 <0 are expected. The estimation results are reported in Table 1. 
The results show that the interest rate component moves from insignificant to highly 
significant as the sample extends and is slowly followed by the relative price component 
whereas the tax rate component goes in the opposite direction. 
                                                                                                                                              
11 The DOLS is chosen mainly for convenience and its relatively good properties. For discussions on 
various panel cointegration estimating methods, see also, Phillips and Moon (1999; 2000). 
12 Since some sample observations of the cost variable are negative because of large negative real interest 
rates, we shift the real interest rate net of the depreciation rate upward by adding one to the whole series 
before taking log transformation. This adjustment should only affect the magnitude of the constant term. 
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Next, we turn to the estimation of the long-run effect of the institutional variables in 
(15). In order to save degrees of freedom, we restrict 1=σ  in view of the full-sample 
result in Table 1, as well as the knowledge that most of the existing studies on China’s 
aggregate production and investment use the Cobb-Douglas function, which implies unit 
elasticity of substitution. In other words, the estimation is based on the following: 
(15’)  τζτ itj jitji
it
it xAC
YI ++=






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


− ∑lnln  
Due to the uncertain time-series properties of the institutional variables, two methods are 
used: (a) DOLS and (b) feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) applied directly to 
(15’).13 ix4 Variables  and 5x  turn out to be insignificant in the estimation and thus are 
removed from the final version of the model. Table 2 reports the main estimation results. 
The results show that the estimates of 2τ  and 3τ  do not differ significantly under different 
methods or different sample periods, indicating that 1x  is the most likely variable 
containing unit roots among the three. Therefore, we choose the DOLS method and restrict 
13 −=τ  to reduce the coefficient uncertainty in the estimation of 
τζ it  (see the last column 
of Table 2). The overall results show that both fiscal policy variables have positively 
encouraged disequilibrium investment. The highly robust negative coefficient estimates for 
xi3 are confirmatory of the view that provinces have been competing with each other to 
invest more if they notice that they have fallen behind their neighbours in the investment 
race. 
However, it is inadequate to infer from the long-run estimation or cointegration 
analysis that the disequilibrium which has been detected is actually driving the dynamic 
movement of the explained variable, see e.g. Johansen (2006). To test whether τζ it  is at 
                                               
13 The ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals are used as the weights of the FGLS estimator. 
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work, i.e. whether it impacts on investment movements, we run the following error-
correction model (ECM): 
(18)   itit
k
kitkitiit XBIAI υλζθ
τ ++∆+∆+=∆ −
=
−− ∑ 1
1
0
1lnln  
where ( )3,2,1,,ln,ln =∆∆∆=∆ jxCYX jitititit  is a vector of all the short-run 
explanatory variables. A significant 0<λ  is expected if τζ it  is to have its hypothetical 
effect on investment. The combined generalised method of moments (GMM) is used for 
estimation. Equation (18) is parsimoniously reduced and the final result is reported in 
Table 3. It is seen from Table 3 that τζ it  does exhibit significant negative feedback impact, 
albeit quite small, 14
We can now move to the empirical interpretation of the AE measures postulated in the 
previous sections. The embedded long-run term in Table 3 gives us: 
 and that the diagnostic test statistics do not show any sign of 
significant mis-specification. 
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They correspond to itζ  in (12) and 
τζ
it
 in (15), respectively. The two series are plotted in 
Figure 3, as well as ττ ζζ itititZ ˆˆˆln −= . Figure 4 gives an alternative plot of itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ  by 
province. Several features are worthwhile noting from these figures. First, investment 
misallocation is more serious if judged by the perfect market condition than by the 
imperfect market condition, i.e. itζˆ  in the top panel shows greater volatility than 
τζ
it
ˆ  in the 
middle panel in Figure 3, or the dotted curves are closer to the zero line than the solid 
curves in Figure 4. Moreover, the misallocation gets slightly worse over time under the 
perfect market condition, a feature due apparently to the institutional effects, as shown by 
                                               
14 This result is consistent with what Sun (1998) and Song et al (2001) find. 
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the dotted linear trends in the top and bottom panels of Figure 3. In other words, there is a 
slight improvement of AE in the firm behaviour of investment demand over time once the 
institutional effects are controlled for (see the dotted trend line in the middle panel of 
Figure 3). If we look at the province profile of τζ
it
ˆ  in Figure 4, we see it moving closer to 
the zero line for many provinces, suggesting certain improvement of AE in firms’ 
aggregate investment demand as reforms proceed. Another noticeable feature is the visible 
slow curvature in most of the series shown in Figure 4, indicating significant 
autocorrelation. Indeed, the autocorrelation test results show (see Table 4) that the majority 
of the series are auto-correlated in the first order, if not the second. This reflects the fact 
that correction of investment misallocation is normally a rather slow process because of 
very high adjustment costs. Finally, the major autonomous municipals, i.e. Beijing, Tianjin 
and Shanghai, are among the most prominent in over-investment under both conditions, 
though somewhat more moderate under the imperfect market condition; on the other hand, 
over-investment appears to be mainly a government behaviour in provinces such as Inner 
Mongolia (NM), Tibet (XZ), Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang, as over-investment largely 
disappears in these provinces once the institutional effects have been accounted for, the 
most noticeable province being Tibet. 
To further investigate the inter-province correlation in these AE measures, we apply 
principal component analysis (PCA) to itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ , as well as to itυˆ , see Tables 5, 6 and 7. 
Notice that itυˆ  can be viewed as a broader AE measure than 
τζ itˆ  in the sense that itυˆ  
assumes the part of dynamic adjustment process around (15) to be part of the theory. In 
other words, itυˆ  becomes the disequilibrium investment rate when the entire equation (18) 
is regarded as corresponding to the theoretical model (15). Under this broad view, the rate 
can be interpreted as agents’ investment demand error judged by both the equilibrium 
demand and the dynamic adjustment costs towards the equilibrium.  
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Several features are noteworthy from Tables 5, 6 and 7. First, there appears to be a 
strong herding effect among provinces in investment misallocation, as shown from the 
strong correlation in itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ  in contrast to the correlation in itυˆ . For example, itζˆ  has 
the smallest numbers of principal components while itυˆ  has the largest numbers to account 
for 90% of data variance as shown in Table 5. Clearly, the relatively stronger herding 
shown in itζˆ  as compared to 
τζ itˆ  is attributed to the institution-induced allocative 
inefficiency. Nevertheless, the herding effect largely remains even after the institutional 
effects are accounted for, as seen from comparison of itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ  in Tables 6 and 7. 
Moreover, these tables illustrate predominantly positive principal component loadings for 
itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ , especially in the first principal component, which accounts for the largest data 
variance. This suggests that firms’ investment demand on the whole is still very much 
under the influence of the macro policies in the sense that firms across different provinces 
tend to herd in making investment allocation errors in the same direction. This evidence 
can be viewed as confirming the competitive effect postulated by Qian and Roland (1998). 
Finally, results from the PCA by year show that the herding effect is highly persistent, 
confirming again that it takes a long time to correct AE errors.15
Let us now turn to the estimation of the PE measure, Λi, in (9). Taking 
 
1ˆ =σ  from the 
above, we have to estimate αi from the Cobb-Douglas production function in order to get 
an estimate of Λi. Due to lack of aggregate data on capital, data from the industrial sector 
are used here. We have to assume that the spatial pattern of the estimated αi applies to all 
the other sectors. Specifically, these αi are estimated using DOLS based on the following 
specification of a constant-return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function: 
                                               
15 In the PCA by year, each year of the sample is defined as a variable and the 30 provinces are used as 
observations. 
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where YI, LI and KI denote industrial output, labour and capital respectively. Three sets of 
αi are obtained, one for the full sample, another for 1989-2000 and the third for 1992-2004. 
Since the depreciation rate data come as time series, the sample mean δ  is used in the 
calculation of Λi. As for iAˆ , two sets of the estimates are used: one based on model (16) 
which assumes the perfect market condition, and the other based on (15’) which assumes 
an imperfect market condition.16 iΛˆ The resulting  are plotted in Figure 5. 
We see from Figure 5 that the distribution pattern of iΛˆ  appears to be in accord with 
what has usually been observed by researchers, namely the coastal and southern provinces 
tend to be more efficient than inland and western provinces. In particular, our results do 
not contradict Yao’s estimates of technological inefficiency using firm data (2001). 
Moreover, there is a certain improvement of iΛˆ  for many provinces when earlier sample 
estimates are compared with later sample estimates, indicating the effectiveness of the 
reforms. Interestingly, Beijing has a much smaller PE estimate when it is calculated 
assuming the perfect market condition than when it is calculated based on the imperfect 
market condition, whereas the opposite is observed with several of these western 
provinces. Finally, when the ranked PE estimates are compared with the ordered AE 
sample means (see Table 8), an asymmetric pattern emerges. Provinces with relatively 
poor PE ranking tend to suffer from under-investment in AE whereas those with strong PE 
ranking are prone to over-investment rather than equilibrium investment in AE. This 
indicates that the trend of over-investment through capital misallocation has not yet been 
wiped out by the reform, and the production efficiency has not necessarily led to improved 
                                               
16 Many PE indices use the negative of the fixed individual effects to reflect the degree of technological 
inefficiency. Our indices denote PE directly.  
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allocative efficiency at the macro level. This finding verifies the postulate by Bai et al 
(1997) that PE may not imply AE when firms’ objectives are more complicated than profit 
maximisation due to imperfect market environment.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Over-investment at the macro level is a key feature of CPEs. Has this feature been 
stamped out by the extensive economic reforms in China? This study seeks answers to this 
question. An aggregate investment model is developed to evaluate empirically investment 
inefficiency in China. The model is based on the standard capital factor input demand 
theory with associate measures of allocative inefficiency and production inefficiency. The 
model is further adapted to transitional economies where the market is far from perfect in 
the sense that institutional factors can exert significant impacts on investment allocation 
not in accordance with the optimal rules of the market. The model thus enables us to 
identify which institutional factors contribute to allocative inefficiency and how great the 
impact is. 
The model is applied to China’s provincial-panel data for the period 1989-2004. The 
main findings are: 
1. Prior to 2000, investment demand hardly responded to price signals, as most capital 
prices were administered and not allowed freely to emit market-clearing signals until 
very recently. The checks-and-balances mechanism of the market for over-
investment has been weak. 
2. On the other hand, fiscal deficits, at both the national and provincial levels, are found 
to exert significant disequilibrium impacts on investment misallocation. An 
investment network effect is also found to exacerbate over-investment, suggesting 
that provinces will not curb their investment desires until they join ranks with the 
regional leaders of over-investment. 
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3. There are certain signs of gradual improvement in the provincial AE measures once 
the institutional factors are controlled. The significant autocorrelation found in these 
measures and the ECM models demonstrate that adjustments of investment 
misallocation have been very slow. Moreover, the strongly positive cross-correlation 
found in these measures suggests the presence of a broad herding tendency towards 
over-investment rather than under-investment. 
4. The PE measures are found to be broadly in line with the pattern of regional 
development, with southern and coastal provinces being more efficient than western 
provinces. Interestingly, an asymmetric relationship is found between the PE and AE 
measures suggesting that provinces with relatively strong PE measures tend to be 
those with higher over-investment AE measures, whereas provinces with relatively 
lower PE measures are usually clustered at the under-investment end of the AE 
measures. This finding suggests that improvement in PE does not lead to 
improvement in AE and may even encourage over-investment at the macro level. 
We must acknowledge that our efficiency measures have limitations. For example, the 
standard efficiency criterion underlying these measures does not take into account the 
possible positive externality of government non-profit-seeking investment demand, such as 
some infrastructural investments for poverty reduction. But efficiency is a normative 
concept after all. Model-based definitions and testable measures should at least help to 
clarify previously confused views and disorganised evidence, and hopefully to reduce the 
gap between theoretical and empirical studies on the welfare implications of institutional 
changes in transitional economies. 
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APPENDIX 
Main data sources:  
National Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook of China (SYC), Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook of China (IESYC), Statistics on Investment in Fixed Assets of 
China (SIFAC), Provincial Statistical Yearbook (PSY); 
China Finance Ministry: Financial Yearbook of China (FYC); 
People’s Bank of China: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (ACFB). 
Variable definition and source: 
I: Fixed-asset investment at provincial level, SYC and SIFAC, adjusted to constant price 
by PI 
Y: GDP at provincial level, SYC, adjusted to constant price by PY 
PI: Price index of fixed-asset investment at provincial level, SYC 
PY: Price index of GDP at provincial level, SYC 
r: Real interest rate calculated by 3-5 year loan rates net of the growth rate of PI of one-
year lag (proxy for expected inflation of investment goods), SYC and ACFB 
δ: Depreciation rate of fixed assets of state-owned industrial firms at provincial level, FYC 
and PSY (data from 1999 onwards are unavailable and are estimated using previous 
observations together with data of the net gross asset values of state-owned industries at 
provincial level from IESYC) 
π: Tax is derived from total pre-tax profits minus total after-tax profits of industrial firms 
with independent accounting systems at provincial level, tax rate is then calculated 
using tax divided by value-added of the firms, SYC 
1x : Logarithm of the ratio of the total government debt incurred to the total retirement of 
debt and interest payments, SYC 
ix2 : Logarithm of the ratio of provincial government expenditure to revenue, SYC 
ix3 : One-period lagged provincial Ii/Yi in logarithm minus its regional average I/Y in 
logarithm, standardised by the national average of I/Y in logarithm 
ix4 : Logarithm of one-period lagged ratio of provincial per capita GDP to its regional per 
capita GDP, SYC and PSY 
5x : Logarithm of the ratio of the bank loans to bank deposits 
YI: Value-added of Industry at provincial level, IESYC, 1989-1999 
LI: Average employment of Industry at provincial level, IESYC, 1989-1999 
KI: Net fixed assets of Industry at provincial level, IESYC, 1989-1999 
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Abbreviation of provinces by region: 
Coastal region Central region Western region 
BJ Beijing SX Shanxi SC Sichuan 
TJ Tianjin NM Inner Mongolia GZ Guizhou 
HB Hebei JL Jilin YN Yunnan 
LN Liaoning HLJ Heilongjiang XZ Tibet 
SH Shanghai AH Anhui SHX Shaanxi 
JS Jiangsu JX Jiangxi GS Gansu 
ZJ Zhejiang HN Henan QH Qinghai 
FJ Fujian HUB Hubei NX Ningxia 
SD Shandong HUN Hunan XJ Xinjiang 
GD Guangdong     
GX Guangxi     
HAN Hainan     
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Table 1. DOLS estimates of σ  in (16) 
sample 89-2000 92-2000 92-2001 92-2002 92-2003 92-2004 89-2004 
σ 0.2263 
(0.5690) 
0.2305 
(0.6687) 
0.0560 
(0.5015) 
1.0884 
(0.6244) 
1.3418 
(0.6319) 
1.6562 
(0.6459) 
0.9254 
(0.5531) 
Coefficient estimates of the three components of the cost variable (17) 
σ0 0.9655 
(0.6508) 
0.2791 
(0.7773) 
0.8998 
(0.7532) 
1.5623 
(0.7573) 
2.1021 
(0.7724) 
2.5297 
(0.7876) 
2.1276 
(0.6695) 
σ1 -0.0049 
(0.4928) 
-0.1370 
(0.5188) 
-0.0560 
(0.8998) 
0.1568 
(0.5102) 
0.3338 
(0.5228) 
0.8595 
(0.5291) 
0.9013 
(0.4957) 
σ2 -1.0519 
(0.2478) 
-0.8541 
(0.3168) 
-0.5929 
(0.2923) 
-0.3287 
(0.2700) 
-0.1477 
(0.2430) 
-0.0935 
(0.2057) 
-0.3229 
(0.1827) 
Note: The figures in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates of the institutional variables in (15’) 
Estimator DOLS FGLS DOLS 
Sample 89-2004 92-2004 89-2004 92-2004 89-2004 
1τ  0.1897 
(0.042) 
0.3423 
(0.0523) 
-0.0104 
(0.0224) 
0.0588 
(0.0362) 
0.1917 
(0.0458) 
2τ  0.3012 
(0.0239) 
0.2908 
(0.0338) 
0. 2323 
(0.0217) 
0.2527 
(0.0273) 
0.2923 
(0.0295) 
3τ  -1.1343 
(0.0631) 
-1.1284 
(0.0675) 
-0.9323 
(0.0639) 
-0.949 
(0.0672) 
restrict:  
13 −=τ  
Note: The figures in brackets are standard errors. There is no random time effect in the dynamic 
specification of the model. 
 
Table 3. GMM estimation of the dynamic model (18) 
Sample 
 
89-04 
( ) ( ) ( )
titi
titititi xCYI
,1,)027.0(
1,2)0241.0(1,)0733.0(,)2196.0()0251.0(,
ˆ059.0
0787.0ln1721.0ln81.10538.0ln
υζ τ +−
∆−∆−∆+−=∆
−
−−
 
( ) 0097.0ˆvar , =tiυ ; Sargan test: χ2(416) = 271.5 [1.000] 
AR(1): N(0, 1) = -2.324 [0.020];  AR(2): N(0, 1) = 0.4228 [0.672] 
 
Sample: 
 
92-04 
( ) ( ) ( )
titi
titititi xCYI
,1,)0288.0(
1,2)0412.0(1,)084.0(,)3726.0()0398.0(,
ˆ0789.0
1362.0ln2617.0ln6707.10361.0ln
υζ τ +−
∆−∆−∆+−=∆
−
−−
 
( ) 0085.0ˆvar , =tiυ ; Sargan test: χ2(260) = 192.1 [0.999] 
AR(1): N(0, 1) = 2.777 [0.000];  AR(2): N(0, 1) = 2.425 [0.015] 
Embedded 
Long-run ( ) titititi
ti
ti xxxCY
I
,3,2,1,
,
, 3.02.045.1lnln +−−++




=τζ  
Note: One-step estimator is used in GMM since residual heteroscedasticity should not be a significant 
problem once the individual effects have been filtered out, see Arellano and Bover (1995), and also 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Sargan test is an over-identification test of the instrumental variables 
used in GMM with the null being that the instruments are valid. The significant first-order serial 
correlation is an expected feature of the GMM method, see Doornik and Hendry (2001, Chapter 7, 
vol. 3). 
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Table 4. Q-test of autocorrelation for itζˆ  and 
τζ itˆ   
Null: no autocorrelation versus the alternative of 1st order autocorrelation  
 BJ TJ HB SX NM LN JL HLJ SH JS 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
7.7939 
0.1750 
0.3886 
2.3551 
7.1105 
3.1031 
8.0342 
1.3780 
6.5023 
2.7928 
0.7067 
1.3152 
4.1638 
0.0589 
3.8514 
0.7261 
4.5815 
1.6533 
2.6411 
0.0600 
 ZJ AH FJ JX SD HN HUB HUN GD GX 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
6.9760 
1.7902 
3.9845 
2.6061 
7.2132 
1.4808 
7.7675 
3.4769 
4.4321 
2.2807 
7.4363 
2.3363 
11.921 
1.8248 
6.6896 
1.1865 
5.6042 
1.5729 
6.5267 
1.4002 
 HAN SC GZ YN XZ SHX GS QH NX XJ 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
9.5018 
0.1228 
10.971 
4.3597 
12.742 
7.7530 
7.9378 
1.4418 
5.4162 
3.0528 
6.3655 
3.3880 
12.255 
3.8764 
12.513 
1.8824 
10.392 
6.6262 
7.8040 
5.9936 
Null: no autocorrelation versus the alternative of 2nd order autocorrelation 
 BJ TJ HB SX NM LN JL HLJ SH JS 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
8.7137 
0.1946 
0.9943 
2.4435 
11.243 
3.1031 
11.336 
1.9419 
7.2012 
3.3078 
1.2616 
5.61 
5.1732 
0.1667 
6.8278 
1.6691 
5.2594 
4.9618 
3.5282 
1.558 
 ZJ AH FJ JX SD HN HUB HUN GD GX 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
10.272 
2.0617 
4.2784 
2.6275 
11.202 
1.733 
10.110 
3.5476 
5.1038 
2.3306 
9.7441 
2.543 
18.185 
1.9345 
8.0697 
3.0434 
6.7331 
6.0145 
9.0569 
1.4017 
 HAN SC GZ YN XZ SHX GS QH NX XJ 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ
 
13.807 
2.4627 
17.463 
4.574 
1.2515 
12.142 
21.137 
1.4722 
7.138 
3.4222 
9.3443 
4.8743 
19.82 
4.581 
21.434 
2.2204 
15.038 
7.9033 
11.01 
6.8008 
Note: The critical values at 95% for χ2(1) = 3.84 and for χ2(2) = 5.99. 
 
 
Table 5. Number of principal components which account for at least 90% of data variance 
sample Full sample 1989-2000 1992-2000 1992-2004 
AE 
measures itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  
By 
province 
5 6 8 6 6 7 5 5 6 4 5 8 
By year 3 4 9 2 4 8 2 3 7 3 4 8 
Note: Full sample for 
itζˆ  and τζ itˆ  is 1989-2004, but the full sample for itυˆ  is 1991-2004. 
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Table 6. Principal component loadings by province (the first three components only) 
 1st Principal component 2nd Principal component 3rd Principal component 
 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  
Variance 
explained (59%) (55%) (7.8%) (15%) (14%) (4.6%) (10%) (8.5%) (3.3%) 
BJ 0.760 0.647 0.110 -0.182 -0.371 0.325 0.297 0.113 0.199 
TJ 0.568 0.118 -0.239 -0.337 -0.679 -0.354 0.334 -0.304 -0.616 
HB 0.732 0.534 -0.556 -0.503 -0.330 -0.620 -0.287 -0.601 0.048 
SX 0.708 0.767 0.323 0.606 0.102 -0.684 -0.282 0.003 0.238 
NM 0.821 0.881 0.735 0.322 -0.100 -0.074 0.416 0.194 -0.381 
LN 0.371 0.819 0.714 0.639 -0.346 0.302 0.384 0.221 -0.317 
JL 0.656 0.774 0.739 0.341 -0.143 0.028 0.403 0.061 0.264 
HLJ 0.756 0.726 -0.058 -0.386 -0.467 0.490 -0.035 -0.025 -0.254 
SH -0.251 -0.396 -0.538 -0.709 -0.542 -0.187 -0.061 0.116 0.521 
JS 0.566 0.738 0.538 -0.041 -0.316 0.145 0.638 0.120 -0.700 
ZJ 0.905 0.402 0.644 0.217 0.020 -0.178 -0.093 0.777 0.179 
AH 0.727 0.893 0.549 0.367 0.075 -0.464 -0.187 0.008 -0.166 
FJ 0.582 0.749 0.476 -0.625 -0.467 0.298 0.424 -0.103 0.183 
JX 0.823 0.899 0.886 0.535 0.187 -0.285 0.109 0.191 -0.031 
SD 0.735 0.924 0.688 0.532 0.064 -0.502 -0.128 -0.018 0.188 
HN 0.866 0.811 -0.129 -0.323 -0.109 -0.558 -0.134 -0.284 0.101 
HUB 0.687 0.689 -0.101 -0.635 -0.546 0.718 0.254 -0.142 -0.127 
HUN 0.879 0.865 0.352 -0.047 -0.251 0.058 0.336 -0.110 -0.569 
GD -0.491 0.594 0.773 0.350 -0.506 0.330 0.664 0.303 0.024 
GX 0.807 0.598 -0.189 -0.412 -0.408 -0.091 0.260 -0.574 -0.490 
HAN -0.678 0.170 0.704 0.323 -0.583 0.232 0.590 0.619 0.481 
SC 0.975 0.887 0.091 -0.159 0.294 -0.539 -0.068 -0.005 -0.549 
GZ 0.950 0.791 0.241 -0.027 0.561 -0.045 -0.171 -0.095 0.334 
YN 0.864 0.938 0.542 -0.384 0.139 0.195 0.208 0.260 -0.050 
XZ 0.818 0.658 0.057 0.279 0.287 -0.756 -0.099 -0.501 -0.017 
SHX 0.883 0.858 0.561 0.268 0.369 -0.381 -0.226 0.112 0.454 
GS 0.853 0.809 0.020 0.048 0.395 -0.343 -0.465 -0.155 -0.233 
QH 0.897 0.801 0.181 -0.045 0.301 0.104 -0.288 0.057 0.280 
NX 0.936 0.856 0.612 0.265 0.438 -0.439 -0.047 -0.082 -0.124 
XJ 0.931 0.865 0.746 0.035 0.411 0.347 0.071 0.185 0.059 
Note: These are results based on the full sample. 
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Table 7. Principal component loadings by year (the first three components only) 
 1st Principal component 2nd Principal component 3rd Principal component 
 
itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  itζˆ  
τζ itˆ  itυˆ  
Variation 
explained (75%) (73%) (24%) (13%) (12%) (16%) (5.9%) (4%) (14%) 
1989 0.849 0.882  0.285 0.212  -0.088 -0.222  
1990 0.892 0.881  0.257 0.246  -0.146 -0.214  
1991 0.895 0.875 0.017 0.192 0.247 -0.062 -0.187 0.047 0.749 
1992 0.816 0.790 0.282 0.318 0.169 -0.259 -0.342 -0.280 -0.235 
1993 0.785 0.840 -0.340 0.405 0.283 -0.229 -0.365 -0.329 -0.639 
1994 0.871 0.760 -0.470 0.407 0.510 0.493 -0.085 0.309 0.224 
1995 0.910 0.820 -0.137 0.268 0.395 0.499 0.096 0.194 0.546 
1996 0.892 0.891 -0.227 0.251 0.259 0.568 0.317 -0.081 -0.260 
1997 0.909 0.934 0.345 0.108 0.121 0.481 0.367 0.080 0.374 
1998 0.924 0.972 0.618 -0.046 -0.066 0.499 0.357 0.132 -0.189 
1999 0.943 0.899 0.628 -0.127 -0.176 -0.047 0.257 0.264 -0.150 
2000 0.932 0.889 0.750 -0.301 -0.319 0.301 0.150 0.204 -0.211 
2001 0.881 0.877 0.796 -0.432 -0.363 0.375 0.070 0.167 -0.156 
2002 0.827 0.820 0.760 -0.541 -0.515 -0.310 -0.077 -0.021 0.209 
2003 0.766 0.734 0.471 -0.575 -0.587 -0.621 -0.254 -0.178 0.319 
2004 0.696 0.811 0.043 -0.616 -0.508 -0.375 -0.295 -0.139 0.277 
Note: These are results based on the full sample. 
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Table 8. Ordered AE measures versus PE ranks 
Perfect market model Imperfect market model 
1989-2004 1992-2004 1989-2004 1992-2004 
Ordered AE & 
sample mean 
PE 
rank 
Ordered AE & 
sample mean 
PE 
rank 
Ordered AE & 
sample mean 
PE 
rank 
Ordered AE & 
sample mean 
PE 
rank 
SH 0.50 1 SH 0.49 1 SH 0.36 1 SH 0.31 1 
QH 0.39 4 QH 0.44 3 ZJ 0.24 2 BJ 0.25 7 
XZ 0.37 23 XZ 0.40 23 BJ 0.23 7 ZJ 0.23 2 
BJ 0.33 30 BJ 0.36 30 TJ 0.23 11 TJ 0.22 13 
XJ 0.32 9 XJ 0.35 7 GD 0.18 5 GD 0.20 4 
TJ 0.28 6 TJ 0.31 11 FJ 0.13 6 JS 0.17 5 
HAN 0.26 5 NX 0.28 14 SC 0.12 14 FJ 0.16 6 
NX 0.23 18 HAN 0.24 5 HAN 0.12 13 SC 0.16 17 
ZJ 0.20 2 ZJ 0.22 2 JS 0.12 3 SD 0.14 3 
GD 0.10 3 SC 0.14 19 SD 0.11 4 HAN 0.13 10 
SC 0.07 17 NM 0.14 18 HB 0.08 9 HB 0.11 9 
NM 0.06 21 GD 0.10 4 LN 0.06 8 GX 0.09 15 
SX 0.04 8 SX 0.04 8 GX 0.05 15 LN 0.09 8 
YN -0.05 10 YN 0.01 6 XJ 0.04 23 XJ 0.08 23 
HLJ -0.06 16 HUB 0.01 15 YN 0.03 10 YN 0.06 11 
HUB -0.07 14 FJ -0.03 9 SHX 0.00 19 GZ 0.04 21 
FJ -0.08 11 HLJ -0.04 17 NX -0.01 28 NX 0.04 26 
HN -0.10 12 GX -0.06 22 GZ -0.01 22 SHX 0.03 19 
HB -0.11 15 HB -0.08 16 QH -0.05 25 QH -0.01 28 
GX -0.12 22 HN -0.08 10 GS -0.08 27 GS -0.05 27 
SD -0.14 7 GZ -0.12 26 SX -0.08 16 HUB -0.07 18 
SHX -0.17 25 JS -0.13 13 HUB -0.10 18 SX -0.08 14 
GZ -0.20 27 SD -0.14 12 HN -0.10 12 HN -0.09 12 
JS -0.20 13 SHX -0.17 25 HLJ -0.13 20 HLJ -0.12 20 
GS -0.25 29 HUN -0.20 27 NM -0.16 29 NM -0.13 29 
HUN -0.25 26 GS -0.23 28 HUN -0.17 24 HUN -0.14 24 
LN -0.26 19 JL -0.24 24 JX -0.20 26 JX -0.16 25 
JL -0.28 24 LN -0.25 20 AH -0.22 17 AH -0.19 16 
JX -0.33 28 JX -0.30 29 JL -0.24 21 JL -0.21 22 
AH -0.50 20 AH -0.50 21 XZ -0.54 30 XZ -0.43 30 
Note: The positive AE measures indicate over-investment allocation and the negative measures indicate 
under-investment allocation. Hence, the order sequence cannot be regarded as AE ranking.   
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Figure 1. Capital investment, GDP, and other aggregate series (in 100 million yuan) 
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Figure 2.  Ratio of provincial government expenditure to revenue 
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Note: Due to the introduction of a new system of tax division in 1994, post-1994 data on local government revenue do not necessarily reflect the actual income of local 
governments, since the central government returns part of the tax collected nationally to provincial governments. Hence the above graphs can only represent trends of 
local government deficit financing rather than actual degrees of deficit. 
  
 
Figure 3. Estimated AE measures from (19) 
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Note: each bar section contains 16 observations of the period 1989-2004.  
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Figure 4. Estimated AE measures by province 
Solid curve: AE of standard theory; dotted curve: AE of mixed theory 
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Figure 5. Estimated PE measures: iΛˆ   
 Using the individual effects estimated under the perfect market condition 
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Using the individual effects estimated under the imperfect market condition 
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Note: All the measures are standardised to make them comparable. 
 
 
 
